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Abstract
Repurchase Agreements (repos) have received increasing scrutiny as a result of their in-
volvement in the recent financial crisis. While viewed as an important part of the
‘shadow banking system’ allowing non-banks to access liquidity and expand leverage,
the legal and accounting status of most ‘repos’ is still unclear. Meanwhile, the usage of
‘repos’ in the development of emerging financial markets continues to expand, playing
a pivotal role in monetary operations and fixed income markets. In this briefing, I dis-
cuss the main issues surrounding ‘repos’ in relatively undeveloped markets (EMs1) in-
cluding the legal status of the first leg of the ‘repo’ as a true sale and the distinction
between ‘repos’ and ‘sell-buybacks.’ I also discuss aspects of EMs that are relevant to
the adoption of ‘repos.’ Primary among these is the thinness of markets, the legal status
of ‘repos,’ accounting practices, monetary policy. Recommendations are offered re-
garding specific issues common to these countries. 
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1 Kenya and Ukraine would be examples of such markets.
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 1. The main roles for ‘repos’ in emerging markets
Repurchase agreements (‘repos’) in principle should play a pivotal role in the devel-
opment of financial markets2. Basic finance theory tells us that, in order to price risky
financial instruments we need to start with a ‘risk-free’ interest rate and that this
would be from the market for government debt (treasuries). Ideally, this interest rate
should come from secondary market transactions. ‘Repos’ can play important roles
in both the primary and secondary treasury markets and the need for repos in these
regards becomes painfully clear in markets that are not that far removed from the
days when government financed itself through an overdraft facility at the central bank.
In such markets, which are the focus of this briefing, it is common for only a small
percentage of the population (usually financial institutions and sophisticated indi-
viduals) to have an interest in, or knowledge of fixed income concepts as basic as
yield-to-maturity. Moreover, it is likely that a high percentage of those interested in
owing treasuries have not moved beyond a buy and hold ‘strategy’ so that secondary
markets are thin. 
Initially in these economies the government debt market is promoted by only the
central bank or the ministry of finance. However, given the relative lack of sophis-
tication of staff at such institutions, eventually a movement is made towards insti-
tuting a primary dealership system (PDS) in which a select list of financial
institutions is given the ‘privilege’ of exclusive access to the debt auction in return
for the responsibility of quoting both buy and sell prices for a specified list of ma-
turities and with the understanding that investors are to be educated on the basics
of fixed income valuation. Repos, securities lending, and short-sales can play an
important role in the success of PDSs. 
With thin markets, dealers will not want to hold significant inventories of the instru-
ments on which they are required to supply quotes. So, if an ‘ask’ quote is hit, a dealer
will want to ‘repo’ out a security that she does not yet own, and ‘reverse’ in (buy with
an agreement to sell in the future) a security with which to fill the sell order. Alterna-
tively, the dealer might like to be able to borrow the security, possibly from the central
bank.  However, like the dealers, the central bank might not want to hold a significant
inventory of treasuries given market thinness and high interest rate volatility. Or, ex-
isting legislation might prohibit the central bank from holding treasuries for such pur-
poses. Along the same lines, dealers might wish to take a short position, and then to
obtain the security through repos or securities lending. However, prohibitions on
short-sales are common in economies without deep markets for government debt.
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2 Here ‘repo’ is being used as it is commonly defined: an agreement to sell a security with a simultaneous agreement to buy back
the same or equivalent security at a given point in the future.
Another possible role for repos in the development of financial markets comes from
their possible interpretation as collateralized lending. If excess liquidity frequently fails
to move from surplus to deficit banks, it might seem that interbank credit limits are
overly restrictive and that supplemental credit limits based on collateralized lending,
would increase the amount of interbank lending. Although ‘repos’ are not properly
thought of as only collateralized loans, adopting a repo framework, with a limitation
on the ability of the buyer to sell, lend, or re-repo the collateral, might be a way forward
towards a more fully functional market repo. The wisdom of promoting such ‘blocked’
repos, however, will depend on several factors, such as the adequacy of existing bank-
ruptcy laws to enforce set-off. Adopting repo documentation from more developed
countries by itself might not be sufficient to promote such collateralized lending.  
Ideally, repo markets also provide for the mitigation of counterparty risk; the lender of
cash can sell the collateral and then obtain an equivalent security to return at the end
of the repo term. However, in EMs where government debt markets are still thin and
volatile market risk is a more pressing concern to private FIs. While widely accepted
repo frameworks provide for the provision of both initial margin (haircut) and varia-
tional margin (topping up) as a way to mitigate market risk, thin markets make it likely
that there will be no reference prices to use for marking-to-market. More importantly,
without some indication as to what the market price would be, potential participants
in repo markets can be at a loss for how to value the repo collateral. Adopting the use
of initial margin applied to book values might be the best that can be done initially.
Open market repos often are used before the development of market repos. Central
banks often begin to use repos or reverses to manage the amount of reserve money,
or to achieve interest rate targets, the former objective being more common. In con-
cert with a target for reserve money, or M1, or one of the other aggregates and with
the use of a liquidity forecast, many EM central banks ‘sell’ government securities with
an agreement to purchase those securities back at some specified point in the future. 
Such central banks repos might not improve the odds that private financial institu-
tions would accept initiatives intended to ease the way for market repos simply be-
cause repos and reverses conducted by the central bank as part of its monetary
operations need not adhere to internationally accepted conventions regarding law or
accounting. For example, while the idea that the security ‘sold’ in effect serves as col-
lateral in the event that the seller does not pay back the cash, when the seller is the
central bank it is immaterial whether there is an established legal precedent regarding
the ability of the buyer to obtain the collateral since the central bank is exceedingly
unlikely to fail. Similarly, while the ability of the buyer to sell the collateral and return
an equivalent security is generally accepted in developed countries, given a limited
array of alternative investments for cash in many EMs, private FIs might not argueim
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too strongly against such a limitation imposed by a central bank offering a market
rate for their excess reserves. 
Whether or not central bank repos lead the way for market repos depends in large
part on the details of such operations. If the central bank keeps custody of the repo
security, open market repos will be seen as less risky than repos involving custody by
parties that have a higher probability of failure. This might become an impediment
to moving towards more modern infrastructure. Similarly, if the central bank offers
some preferential treatment of open market repo for the calculation of prudential liq-
uidity ratios, the development of market repos is hindered. Perhaps most importantly,
if the central bank refuses to acknowledge that title to the collateral passes to the
seller, an important aspect of repo will be harder to adopt for market repos.
Finally, the overall stance of monetary policy and its implementation operationally
will influence the development of repo markets, money markets, and government debt
markets. Central banks either target prices (interest rates) or quantities (monetary
aggregates), while caring about both. In the early stages of development monetary
aggregates are often targeted as a means to reach an inflation goal. However, if the
central bank is not operationally independent of the finance ministry, it is likely that
its operations in either the primary market or the money market will confuse the mar-
ket. The development of a rational linkage between repo rates and other market in-
terest rates will be that much more difficult.
Summary of suggestions: 
Repos provides a means for getting out of the trap of thin markets implying a lack of
market pricing that impedes the selling of treasury securities which implies thin markets.
By being able to sell (via repo) a security which is simultaneously obtained (via reverse
repo) and then delivered to fulfill the sale, repos allow for increased market depth. How-
ever, it is far from clear whether central bank repos (open market repos) facilitate the
move towards market repos. Central bank repos are often ‘blocked’ so that the repo
security cannot be sold, lent, or re-repoed. Such instruments are in fact better thought
of as collateralized loans with zero default risk. The operation of central banks repos
might actually inhibit the development of market repos if the former are seen offering
benefits in terms of risk-adjusted rate of return or some regulatory benefit. 
The use of primary dealership systems is almost inevitable in the development of gov-
ernment debt markets and this also argues for the use of market repos by the dealers.
While securities lending and short-selling will probably be requested by potential dealers,
the benefits from developing a repo market probably exceed either of the other two.
Consequently EM authorities (usually central banks) are advised to focus on removing
the main obstacles to market repos, primarily legal impediments to selling the collateral. 
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Consideration of other factors driving market thinness is also advisable. For example,
the lack of a benchmarking program can lead to the proliferation of issues, each of
which might be fully subscribed but few of which have much volume in the secondary
markets. Another factor might be the tax system, which might penalize the sale (dis-
investment) of government securities. Finally, market thinness often implies uncer-
tainty about the accounting treatment of sales. Some flexibility and clarity on the part
of the tax authorities might be advisable. 
 2. Repos, Sell-buybacks, and Secured Loans
Confusion about what should be called a repo plagues even discussions about repo
markets in developed economies. For example, in the U.S. it is common to use the
term ‘repo’ and ‘sell-buy back’ interchangeably even though the literature makes clear
the distinction between the two. This usage might be related to the fact that ‘sell-buy
backs’ are seldom used in the U.S. The legal finding that a ‘repo’ was in fact a collat-
eralized loan is common enough that it is a legal risk recognized in the literature.
However the perception still persists in some quarters that repos are essentially col-
lateralized loans. It is difficult to know how many transactions that are described as
‘repos’ should not be described in such a fashion. Most ‘repos’ are never evaluated
by the courts and supervisors cannot be expected to scrutinize all, or even most such
transactions. Moreover, even in relatively modern financial systems (e.g. the U.S. and
the U.K) it has become clear that the legal, accounting, and regulatory treatment of
‘repos’ needs improvement. Consequently it is not clear what exactly the repo market
should look like for a given EM. 
Adding to this confusion is a plethora of types of ‘repos.’ Harding and Johnson (2006)
list 12 types of repos: reverse repo, flex repo, general collateral repo, special repo,
hold-in-custody repo, open repo, overnight repo, term repo, cross-currency repo, tri-
party repo, syndicated repo, and equity repo.  The distinctions between these types
of repos includes those made on the basis of custodial arrangements, settlement con-
ventions, legal treatment, and other aspects too numerous to warrant mention. Not
all of these distinctions are of equal relevance to the development of repo markets in
EMs. In fact, most EMs would be better off focusing on the legal differences between
repos and secured loans and between special repos and general collateral repos. 
It is often said (e.g. Steiner, 1997) that there are three types of ‘repos’; ‘classic’ repos,
sale-buybacks, and securities lending. This particular typology appears driven by the
fact that economically, all three are the same; a security is delivered in exchange for
cash, with the security (or equivalent) returning to the provider and cash plus payment
moving in the opposite direction at an agreed upon point in the future. Securitiesim
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lending, de facto, is a different type of activity whose development is often distinct
from repo initiatives. The importance of the distinction between sell-buybacks and
‘classic’ repos, on the other hand, cannot be overstated for the development of EM
repo markets.
The important differences between ‘classic’ repos (sometimes referred to as ‘true’
repos) and sell-buybacks are as follows: in a classic repo both legs are viewed jointly
as a single transaction whereas a sell-buyback comprises two transactions; in a ‘clas-
sic’ repo the security being sold remains on the books of the seller (preferably with
the accounting treatment showing that such a security is involved in a repo), whereas
for a sell-buyback the security is derecognized; in a ‘classic’ repo any coupon received
during the term of the repo is returned to the seller, whereas for a sell-buyback the
buyer keeps the coupon. It is not clear how important the accounting and regulatory
issues are for the development of EM repos3. However, clarifying the legal, accounting,
settlement, and regulatory treatment of sell-buybacks involves much of what would
be achieved by doing the same for ‘classic’ repos.
At least as important as the accounting differences between ‘classic’ repos and sell-
buybacks is the legal treatment; in both instances legal title is transferred to the buyer
and ‘true’ sale is said to have taken place. The apparent contradiction between title
transfer and lack of derecognition of the security from the books of the seller is ration-
alized by the statement that in a ‘classic’ repo both legs are viewed as a single trans-
action so that the seller retains ‘economic’ exposure to changes in the value of the
security during the repo term. However, this distinction might not be meaningful to
treasury staff in EMs, who will primarily be guided by their local lawyers and account-
ants and not necessarily by first-world best practices. Obvious exceptions to this would
be the multinational banks and perhaps local banks that look to them for guidance.
The crucial point made by saying that true sale has taken place in the first leg of a
‘classic’ repo is that, while the security stays on the books of the seller (who also re-
ceives any coupon), the buyer can sell, lend, or re-repo the security, only having to re-
turn an equivalent security at the end of the repo term. The widespread view that
repos are ‘essentially’ collateralized loans seems consistent with the security staying
on the books of the seller and with the borrower of cash paying the principal balance
plus interest which is equal to the difference between the selling and buying prices. 
It is for good reason that the fact that the security sold can be immediately dealt is
often not properly appreciated by EM market participants; in thin markets for even
government securities the risk of failure to return an equivalent security at the end of
the repo term is relatively high. In the event that the laws guiding such delivery failures
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3 Although the case of Drysdale Securities in the U.S. highlights the risk associated with a lack of  consensus about whether coupon
paying securities should be quoted ex-accrued interest or not. See Acharya and Oncu (2010).
are poorly developed it would be understandable for the authorities to minimize the
probability of such events by restricting the ability of the cash lender (buyer) to deal
freely with the security. In the event that the buyer is unable to deal at all with the se-
curity, the repo is often said to be ‘blocked.’ Open market repo operations conducted
by central banks in EM are often conducted in such a manner. Unfortunately, such
transactions might better be described as collateralized loans, rather than pretending
that a sale has taken place.
Listing the various ways in which repo documents might trigger recharacterization
and then trying to avoid these is unlikely to be a fruitful way to proceed. On such
matters even U.K. and continental lawyers might disagree (Choudhry, 2006). How-
ever, limiting the ability of the buyer to deal freely with the security by specifying
that the identical security must be returned is a likely trigger. And even specifying
that returning a different security requires approval of the authorities might be
enough to hold up market development (one sub-Saharan African country in which
the author worked).
With the benefit of hindsight regarding the history of repo markets development in
countries such as the U.S. we can advise that EMs pass legislation clarifying the
property rights associated with repos rather than awaiting piecemeal clarifications
through the courts. 
An alternative to clarifying the legal status of ‘classic’ repos is to clarify the treatment
of buy-sell backs. The attractiveness of proceeding in this manner is that such an in-
strument clearly is comprised of two separate transactions so that its confusion with
a collateralized loan is far less likely and the ability of the buyer to sell, lend, or re-
repo the security is less likely to be in dispute. At the same time, buy-sell backs are
economically equivalent to ‘classic’ repos so that some of the benefits will still be ob-
tainable. Primarily among these should be market deepening, and the emergence of
generally acceptable reference prices and yields. The value of the opportunity to de-
velop an understanding about the proper accounting and regulatory treatment of
such instruments also should not be underestimated.
Summary of suggestions:
While what constitutes a ‘repo’ for legal, accounting, and regulatory purposes is cru-
cial for the development of market repos, the choice between ‘classic’ repos and sell-
buy backs is unclear for a given country. The determining factor might be the legal
traditions, as they impinge on the ability of the lender of cash (seller) to sell on the
collateral. The main benefit for many EMs of repos can be obtained with sell-buy-
backs; market deepening. However, sell-buybacks, as commonly understood, do not
require as much documentation, do not involve margining (which might be burden-im
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some to some counterparties), and do not involve close-out netting. In other words,
sell-buybacks are simpler to implement. However, the widespread use of repos in de-
veloped financial markets argues in their favor and sell-buybacks should only be seen
as steppingstones towards that goal.
 3. Legal Frameworks
Master repurchase agreements have become the preferred vehicle for laying out the
legal, accounting, and settlement detail for repos, even allowing for the inclusion of
sell-buy backs in the case of the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA). It
should be noted the securities lending has its own master agreement and both General
Collateral (GC) and special repos are covered by the three major master agreements,
the GMRA (which is based on U.K. legal precedent), the Master Repurchase Agree-
ment used in the U.S. and the European Master Agreement developed by the Euro-
pean Union. While some countries have developed their own, customized master
repurchase agreements (e.g. Sri Lanka), the case for adhering to an internationally
accepted standard can be overwhelming in some environments. The most important
factor determining whether customization is feasible will likely be whether there is al-
ready in place a generally accepted and workable legal framework for collateralized
lending. However, to the extent that the relevant portion of the law is still evolving
the case for customization is weakened.
The GMRA appears to have emerged as the preferred master agreement for repos,
perhaps in part because of the wealth of evidence about how European countries
have adapted their laws so as to ensure consistency with the intended use of the
GMRA. However, for many EMs, many aspects of the GMRA will not be applicable
for some time and the question then becomes whether to have all the intended par-
ticipants sign onto an agreement that will not be fully enforced. There can be no gen-
eral answer to this question but it should be pointed out that the development of
accepted ‘business’ practices can provide a bridge to the day when all aspects of the
master agreement are enforced. Local treasurers associations, for example, can play
an important role.
For many EMs, the most important part of the GMRA will be its clarification that
repos explicitly involve title transfer so that there is clear intent for ‘true’ sale and re-
purchase. The seller is said to only have a proprietary interest. However, having signed
onto this agreement will then place demands on the existing legal system’s treatment
of collateralized loans and sales of government debt, the most likely type of collateral.
Ultimately title transfer and the ability to set-off in the event of the bankruptcy of the
borrower will have to be validated by the courts.
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The requirement for netting that is embedded in the GMRA is a steep hurdle for many
EMs. Not only might this be inconsistent with existing bankruptcy regimes, it might
be difficult given the settlement infrastructure and market thinness. Close-out netting,
for example, requires the valuation of all of the securities being used for repo between
the two parties.
A third major aspect of the GMRA is that it envisions the use of margining. While ini-
tial margin is possible it is stated that “If the value of the bonds sold to the Buyer falls
during the life of the repo transaction, the Buyer is entitled under paragraph 4 (Margin
Maintenance) to call for more bonds or for Cash Margin to maintain the value of the
bonds against which it has paid out its cash at the start of the repo transaction.4 ” It
is thus clear that variational margining can be induced by the choice of the buyer. In
principle, it is possible that in Annex I, the parties to any bilateral repo agreement
could agree to not provide variational margin. However, based on the discussion on
Harding and Johnson (2004) such an exception is not usually made.
Variational margining is difficult in thin markets, even if the regulatory authorities
clarify how it could be done. Yield curves constructed from historical data are not
likely to be accepted if markets are volatile and yield curves promoted by private as-
sociations might be met with suspicion. It would be unwise for the central bank or
other public entity to put forward a yield curve viewed as indicative of current market
conditions as this would be tantamount to indicating the stance of monetary policy.
Perhaps the best that could be hoped for initially is that the practice of initial (haircut)
margining be adopted as a minimum, with some study done of the factors bearing
on the amount of the haircut. On the other hand, if two parties agree to variational
margining, specifying a manner in which this is to be done, the authorities should not
react to this by requiring that all counterparties to repos follow suit. It is quite possi-
ble, for example, that a large multinational bank would have generated its own yield
curve which it could then offer for use in variational margining for all those who wish
to conduct repos with it. 
Summary:
There is no general answer to whether or not a given EM should write a customized
master repurchase agreement. It is probably only advisable if the groundwork has
been laid in terms of the development of a relatively modern bankruptcy code and
thus the establishment of collateralized lending. However, even then, as the financial
system develops subsequent master agreements would be needed and the issue of
consistency with international standards would arise. The alternative is to adopt
an accepted international standard master agreement and then come to an under-
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4 Paragraph 2, (f).
standing (business practice) about how to deal with provisions of these that were
not yet feasible.
Netting and margining are two examples of risk management specified in the inter-
national standard agreements that are likely to be problematic for EMs. Netting is
facilitated with the deepening of financial markets and also with the installation of
appropriate infrastructure. Variational margining can be promoted by flexible and
clear regulation. For example, there is no reason why there needs to be unanimous
agreement within the private sector about the market price; there can be multiple ac-
cepted sources of such information and Annex I of the GMRA can be used to specify
which would be acceptable for counterparties.
 4. Accounting and Regulation
As the accounting rules for repos are evolving in response to the financial crisis au-
thorities in EMs seeking to promote market repos should focus on clarifying any as-
pects of accounting and regulation that might be impeding market development.
For example, for a ‘classic’ repo which is governed by a master agreement or is oth-
erwise constrained to be a single transaction albeit with two legs, the accepted
treatment for the seller is to keep the collateral on the books. That this is different
for a sell-buyback is explained by there being two legally separate transactions for
that instrument. However, as a first step towards adequate collateral management,
the seller should provide a separate heading indicating that a certain security is in-
volved in a repo. 
The borrower of cash is viewed as having a cash liability while the security that has
been sold is not viewed as a liquid asset for the calculation of prudential liquidity ra-
tios. In markets with excess liquidity these rules might not appear to be of much sig-
nificance. However, some general principles should still be followed. First, there
should be no net increase in system wide prudential liquidity resulting from repo be-
tween private counterparties. Second the treatment of central bank repos and market
repos should not be inconsistent. To the extent that the central bank is mopping up
liquidity (reducing a monetary aggregate) the prudential liquidity of the private sector
would be reduced. 
In the event that the counterparties to the central bank repos contest the accepted
regulatory treatment of the exchange of cash for security, the central bank might
be tempted to deviate from the standard rather than to allow the open market repo
rate to be influenced. Such considerations also arise when considering whether to
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treat central bank reverse repos in an asymmetric fashion, as some banks do
(Choudhry, 2006). 
The regulatory capital treatment of repos is currently being re-evaluated, in light of a
re-focusing on the importance of collateral management associated with the financial
crisis. However, it is likely that the nature of the collateral will still be relevant along
with the extent of documentation. The last has generally been interpreted as implying
that repos done under one of the major master agreements would receive preferential
treatment. However, this presumes that the master agreements would have been made
consistent with local bankruptcy proceeding and that the netting provisions in the
master agreement would be upheld. Given the increased attention being given to repo
markets it would be unwise for authorities in EMs to base repo initiatives on assump-
tions about how the capital treatment of these instruments will evolve.
Summary:
It goes without saying that the accounting and regulatory treatment of repos in EMs
should not deviate much from international standards. However, as international
standards for repos are evolving, authorities in EMs should focus on developmental
aspects. A clear distinction has been made between derecognition of the security sold
in a sell-buyback and the lack of derecognition of a security sold in a repo. This cor-
responds to the coupon treatment and the provision of margin for the latter. This
distinction should be maintained, clarified by the authorities and logically related to
the treatment of regulatory capital.
Prudential liquidity calculations can also be a concern. The general view has been
that the repo security is not a liquid asset for the buyer. On the other hand, as has
been made apparent by the recent crisis, there is a broader sense in which repos in-
crease liquidity. The authorities need to consider their overall monetary policy stance
when promulgating such regulations. Furthermore they need to consider any distor-
tions that might be introduced by differential treatment of central bank repos and
market repos for liquidity ratio calculations. 
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